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Abstract
In this paper a new multi-candidate electronic voting
scheme is constructed with unlimited participants. The
main idea is to express a ballot to allow voting for up
to k out of the m candidates and unlimited participants.
The purpose of vote is to select more than one winner
among m candidates. Our result is complementary to
the result by Sun peiyong′ s scheme, in the sense, their
scheme is not amenable for large-scale electronic voting
due to flaw of ballot structure. In our scheme the vote
is split and hidden, and tallying is made for Go¨del en-
coding in decimal base without any trusted third party,
and the result does not rely on any traditional cryptogra-
phy or computational intractable assumption. Thus the
proposed scheme not only solves the problem of ballot
structure, but also achieves the security including per-
fect ballot secrecy, receipt-free, robustness, fairness and
dispute-freeness.
Keywords: electronic voting; ballot structure; Go¨del en-
coding
1 Introduction
Electronic voting plays an important role in the crypto-
graphic applications. In recent years, the traditional vot-
ing has been gradually replaced by electronic voting. An
e-voting scheme is a set of protocols that allow a collec-
tion of voters to cast their votes, while enabling a collec-
tion of authorities to collect the voters, compute the final
tally, and communicate the final tally that is checked by
tally-clerk. Generally e-voting protocols adopt the group
signature [1], verifiable password sharing, homomorphic
encryption [2] and limited commitment protocol, etc. In
1981, the first e-voting is proposed by Chaum D [3]. In
1996, Cramer [4] posed the problem of multi-candidate
vote. Based on the ElGamal homomorphic encryption,
Cramer el al. [5] proposed a 1−out−of−m electronic vot-
ing scheme. However, this scheme is difficult to avoid the
situation that same voters repeatedly vote, and it cannot
achieve the k− out− of −m e-voting. In 2001, Damgard
el al. [6] proposed a k−out−of−m voting scheme based
on the Paillier system, while it has the same problem as
the Cramer scheme. In 2006, a multi-candidate e-voting
scheme (called Zhong-Huang scheme) was proposed by
Zhong et al [7]. The scheme adopted a secure sum proto-
col [8–10] to achieve the k − out− of −m voting scheme
and solve the problem as the Cramer scheme. Neverthe-
less, by analysis, Zhong-Huang scheme has a flaw that
the flaw could disclose the information of voters due to
the ballot construction. To overcome the flaw, in 2012, a
secure e-voting scheme with multi-candidate (called Sun-
Liu scheme) was proposed by Sun et al [11].The scheme
achieves the perfect ballot secrecy by adopting the ran-
dom number to blind the vote. However, this scheme is
only suitable for small-scale voting due to the flaw of bal-
lot construction.
In this paper, a multi-candidate electronic voting
scheme with unlimited participants was proposed by us-
ing the Go¨del encoding to tally vote. Firstly the identity
of candidate is masked by using prime number and the
process is operated in decimal. Then the ballot of voter
and random number are distributed to other voters by
secure channel. Finally the result is computed by ev-
ery voter and is broadcasted to all participants. In this
protocol, every voter can tally to achieve the fairness and
unlimited participants, perfect ballot secrecy, receipt-free,
robustness and dispute-freeness.
In section 2, a brief introduction of Go¨del coding is in-
troduced and some conditions and properties are defined.
The scheme of Sun-Liu is presented in detail and a sim-
ple example is given in Section 3. In section 4 the new
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scheme is presented in detail and the experimental results
are shown in section 5. Section 6 gives the performance
analysis of the presented scheme. The conclusions are
described in Section 7.
2 Preliminary knowledge
2.1 Go¨del coding
In 1931,Go¨del used a system based on prime factorization
and assigned a unique natural number to each basic sym-
bol in the formal language of arithmetic. To encode an
entire formula, the following system was used by Go¨del.
Given a sequence (x1, x2, . . . , xn) of positive integers,
the Go¨del encoding of the sequence is the product of the
n primes raised to their corresponding values in the se-
quence: enc(x1, x2, . . . , xn) = 2
x13x2 . . . pxnn .
According to the fundamental theorem of arithmetic,
any number (and, in particular, a number obtained in
this way) can be uniquely factored into prime factors,
so it is possible to recover the original sequence from its
Go¨del numbers (for any given number n of symbol to be
encoded).
2.2 Basic definition
Definition 1: In the protocol, the semi-honest person
fully obeys the regulation of e-voting. However the
semi-honest person could collect all records and try to
infer information of other voters in the acting process.
This semi-honest person is also called the passive at-
tacker.In this paper, involved members are assumed
to be semi-honest members.
Definition 2: The e-voting scheme with unlimited par-
ticipants is called secure and feasible, if it satisfies
the following properties.
(1) Unlimited participants: The e-voting scheme al-
lows for unlimited participants.
(2) Perfect ballot secrecy: If there are t(t < n) voters
have been colluded among n voters, t voters only get
their own vote and cannot get the voting result of
other voters.
(3) Receipt-free: Voters are unable to provide his
vote to outside world and the vote data cannot be
proved to other people.
(4) Robustness: Voters cannot interrupt the normal
process of the protocol.
(5) Fairness: All voters can get the voting result, and
a single individual cannot tally in advance.
(6) Dispute-freeness: Any voter can verify the cor-
rectness of the result and can test the honesty of vot-
ers.
3 Sun - Liu Scheme and Analysis
of applicability
3.1 Sun-Liu scheme
In Sun-Liu scheme, n voters (P1, P2, . . . , Pn) are set with
equal status, same rights, and were registered before the
vote. There are m candidates (C1, C2, . . . , Cm), and the
ballot format is 00 . . .0aj . The bit length is k, the last
bit is aj , and the remaining bits are 0. k = [log2 n] + 1,
so the total bit length is mk. The value of aj depends
on the wish of voters. Only when voters agree with the
candidate, aj = 1; otherwise aj = 0. The voting scheme
is divided into three stages: voting, casting, and tallying.
The ballot format is shown in Table 1 .
Table 1: The ballot format to support multi-candidate
Candidate Ballot Format
C1 00 . . . 0a1
C2 00 . . . 0a2
...
...
Cm 00 . . . 0am
(1) Voting
Pi(i = 1, 2, . . . , n) makes a vote for candidates Cj(j =
1, 2 . . . ,m) in the electronic vote. The value of aj(j =
1, 2, . . . ,m) is 1 or 0. Then according to the binary se-
quence, Pi(i = 1, 2, . . . , n) gets a decimal number vi.
(2) Casting
Pi(i = 1, 2, . . . , n) randomly selects a decimal Ri and
gets Si = vi + Ri. Then Si is divided into n smaller
integers sij , such that Si =
n∑
i=1
sij . sij is sent to other
voters Pj(j = 1, 2, . . . , n, j 6= i) by a secure channel [12]
[13]. Pj calculates S
′
i =
n∑
j=1
sij after receiving the n − 1
random numbers sij(i = 1, 2, . . . , n, i 6= j).Then Pi(i =
1, 2, . . . , n) calculates v
′
i = S
′
i −Ri.
(3) Tallying
v
′
i is broadcasted to the other voters. Then Pi(i =
1, 2, . . . , n) calculates the sum T =
n∑
i=1
v
′
i. T from:
T =
n∑
i=1
vi
′ =
n∑
i=1
(S
′
i − Ri) =
n∑
i=1
S
′
i −
n∑
i=1
Ri =
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
sij−
n∑
i=1
Ri =
n∑
j=1
n∑
j=1
sij−
n∑
i=1
Ri =
n∑
i=1
Si−
n∑
i=1
Ri =
n∑
i=1
(Si −Ri) =
n∑
i=1
vi.
Finally, Pi(i = 1, 2, . . . , n) is able to get the binary
sequence from T ,then the binary sequence is intercepted
in every k bits. The voting result of Cj(j = 1, 2, . . . ,m)
is obtained.
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3.2 Example: 7 voters vote for 3 candi-
dates
The example of 7 voters vote for 3 candidates is used to
explain the Sun-Liu scheme. The scheme is divided into
3 steps.
(1) Voting
The voting result is shown in Table 2
Table 2: 7 ballots for 3 candidates
Candidate Vote
Voter A B C Binary Decimal
P1 001 000 001 001000001 65
P2 000 000 001 000000001 1
P3 001 000 000 001000000 64
P4 000 001 001 000001001 9
P5 001 001 001 001001001 73
P6 000 001 000 000001000 8
P7 000 001 000 000001000 8
(2) Casting
Step 1: Selecting a random number Ri and calculate
Si from:
Si = vi +Ri
The result is shown in Table 3
Table 3: The result of ballots randomization
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7
vi 65 1 64 9 73 8 8
Ri 10 12 2 6 11 25 6
Si 75 13 66 15 84 33 14
Step 2: Si is divided into seven smaller sub-digits by
Pi(i = 1, 2, . . . , 7) and is sent to other voters. The transfer
matrix is shown in Figure.1
Figure 1: The transfer matrix of Sun-Liu scheme
Step 3: Calculate the sum of jth list from:
S
′
i =
n∑
j=1
sij
Here sij is an element of Si divided in Figure.1.
Step 4: Calculate the result of derandomization from:
v
′
i = S
′
i −Rj
Step 5: Broadcast v
′
i, the result is shown in Table 4.
Table 4: Voter cuts the random number
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7
S
′
i 42 46 42 40 45 42 43
Ri 10 12 2 6 11 25 6
v
′
i 32 34 40 34 34 17 37
(3) Tallying
he amount of votes is T =
7∑
i=1
v
′
i = 32+ 34+ 40+ 40+
38 + 12 + 37 = 228,then sequence 011100100is got from
228 and is intercepted in every 3 bits. So the voting result
of A, B, and C are 3, 4, and 4 respectively.
3.3 Adaptive analysis of Sun-Liu scheme
In Sun-Liu scheme, the bit length of vote is mk =
m(log
2
n + 1), when mk > 64, the bit length will lead
to more consumption of computing time. So in mk > 64,
the method is low efficiency. If m = 9, n = 1000, the
binary bit length is mk = 90, the situation has more con-
sumption of computing time than mk < 64.
4 A multi-candidate electronic
voting scheme with unlimited
participants
In view of the boundedness of the Sun-Liu scheme, the
ballot structure is improved to achieve the aim of unlim-
ited participants by the multiplication in the finite field
Fp (p is a big prime). The process is following:
(1) Voting
P1, P2, . . . , Pm (a total ofm primes) are respectively m
identities of candidates. Voter Li(i = 1, 2, . . . , n) makes
vote for m candidates. If the candidate is agreed, Li(i =
1, 2, . . . , n) selects the prime which represents the identity
of candidate, otherwise the number 1 is selected instead.
(2) Casting
Li(i = 1, 2, . . . , n) randomly selects arbitrary primes to
be regarded random number Ri in the m primes. Li(i =
1, 2, . . . , n) sends sij to other voters Lj(j = 1, 2, . . . , n, j 6=
i) by secure channel, where sij consists of the selected
prime, Ri, and 1. Lj(j = 1, 2, . . . , n) receives sij(i =
1, 2, . . . , n, i 6= j) from n− 1 voters, and the process could
be showed by transfer matrix Figure.2.
(3) Tallying
Li(i = 1, 2, . . . , n) gets the result vi =
2x
′
13x
′
2 . . .mx
′
nR−1i by calculating (R
−1
i is inverse element
of Ri) and broadcast to Lj(j = 1, 2, . . . , n, j 6= i) by se-
cure channel. Lj calculates the product T after receiving
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Figure 2: Transfer matrix
other n− 1 results, namely T =
∏n
i=1 vi = 2
x13x2 . . . fxn ,
the sequence (x1, x2, . . . , xn) is the voting result of
corresponding candidate respectively.
5 Example
5.1 Example 1
7 voters vote for 3 candidates
(1) Voting
The situation of vote is shown in Table 5
Table 5: 7 ballots for 3 candidates
P1 P2 P3 Select
Voter 2 3 5 Random number
L1 2 1 5 2,3
L2 1 1 5 3,5
L3 2 1 1 5
L4 1 3 5 3
L5 2 3 5 2,5
L6 1 3 1 2,3
L7 1 3 1 2,3
(2) Casting
Step 1: Li(i = 1, 2, . . . , 7) gets data sij and broad-
casts to other voters Lj(j = 1, 2, . . . , n, j 6= i) by secure
channel. The transfer matrix is shown in Figure.3.
Figure 3: The transfer matrix
Step 2: After calculating the product of ith list and
broadcasts to other voters, the result is :
v1 = 2
4 · 51 · 3−1
v2 = 3
4 · 51
v3 = 3
1 · 51
v4 = 1
v5 = 5
−1
v6 = 5
1
v7 = 5
1 · 2−1
(3) Tallying
The amount of vote is T =
∏n
i=1 vi =
v1v2v3v4v5v6v7 = 2
3 · 34 · 54, so the voting result of
P1, P2, P3 are 3, 4, 4 respectively.
5.2 Example 2
1000 voters vote for 9 candidates
(1) Voting
The voting situation is shown in Table 6
Table 6: 1000 voters vote for 8 candidates
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 Select
Voter 2 3 5 7 11 13 17 Random number
L1 2 1 1 7 1 13 1 2,3,5
L2 1 1 5 7 1 1 1 3,7,17
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
L4 1 1 1 7 1 1 17 7,11,13,17
(2) Casting
Step 1: Li(i = 1, 2, . . . , 1000) gets sij and sends it to
Lj(j = 1, 2, . . . , n, j 6= i) by secure channel, the transfer
matrix is shown in Figure.4.
Figure 4: The transfer matrix
Step 2: After calculating the ith list, Li gets the re-
sult vi and broadcasts by checking table 4, the result is
following:
L1 = 2
1 · 51 · · · 2−1 · 3−1 · 5−1
L2 = 7
2 · · · 3−1 · 7−1 · 17−1
...
L1000 = 13
1 · · · 7−1 · 11−1 · 13−1 · 17−1
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(3) Tallying
The amount of vote is T =
∏n
i=1 vi = v1v2 · · · v1000 =
2x1 ·3x2 ·5x3 ·7x4 ·11x5 ·13x6 ·17x7, so the vote of P1P2 · · ·P7
are x1x2 · · ·x7 respectively.
According to the analysis of example, the aim of un-
limited participants is achieved in the protocol.
6 Analysis of performance
Theorem 1. The result is correct based on Go¨del encod-
ing.
Proof. According to Figure.2, a transfer matrix is got
by randomly splitting the ballot.
∏n
i=1
∏n
j=1 sij =∏n
j=1
∏n
i=1 sij = T ,so the product of all elements does
not change before sending vote and after receiving vote.
The Go¨del encoding sets up a sole corresponding relation
for T and limited positive integer sequence. According
to the relation, the voting result is got. So the result is
right.
Theorem 2. If all voters are semi-honest, the e-voting
scheme with unlimited participants is secure and feasible.
Proof. The following ideas reflectively prove that our pro-
gram meets all security properties raised by defination 2
(1) Unlimited participants: The ballot format adopts
the form of decimalism and it has not relation with the
amount of participants. In theory, the amount of candi-
dates only relates to the number of primes. For example,
if the election has 1 billion candidates, 1 billion primes are
found. Then according to the protocol, the voting result
is got.
(2) Perfect ballot secrecy: Li(i = 1, 2, . . . , n) randomly
selects the random number Ri to conceal the ballot before
sending the vote. Only when n−1 voters are collaborated,
the secret ballot of voter is calculated by the protocol.
So the protocol can resist the attack from n − 1 passive
attackers. When t(t < n) voters are collaborated, the
voters only can get their own ballot and cannot get other
voting result. So perfect ballot secrecy can be achieved.
(3) Receipt-free: By the random number, the ballot is
concealed and sij is split into n parts and is sent to other
voters. Any voter cannot reconstruct the complete vote,
because Lj only can receive sij from Li. So the vote is
receipt-free.
(4) Robustness: When t(t < n) has been abstained
from election, the vote data cannot be sent in casting. In
tallying, the process still can be started by cooperation of
remaining voters.
(5) Dispute-freeness: The voting result is tallied by all
voters, if the result of one or a few voters is not same with
most voters, these voters are dishonest persons. More-
over, by making public all v
′
i we also can test and verify
and track the dishonest voters.
6.1 Scheme comparison
The scheme need not using binary sequence to express
vote, which avoids the situation of digit overflow, at the
same time the ballot structure does not have relation with
the amount participants. So the protocol can achieve
the situation of unlimited participants. Our solution only
needs to send selected prime number and random num-
ber to Lj(j = 1, 2, . . . , n, j 6= i), then Li(i = 1, 2, . . . , n)
gets the result by arranging the data of the ith list and
broadcast to other voters. In contrast with the Sun-Liu
scheme, our solution not only satisfies the security of e-
voting but also improves computing efficiency to achieve
unlimited participants.
7 Conclusion
The protocol uses the Go¨del coding to solve the problem
of low efficiency in previous schemes. In this paper, the
scheme does not rely on traditional encryption algorithms
to ensure the security of ballot and does not contain any
scabrous computational problem. In information theory,
the protocol is secure. The e-voting can be applied to elec-
tion of any scale by the scheme, for example large-scale
electronic auction, electronic tending, et al. Although the
problem for number of restrictions is solved, the insecure
channel and dishonest voter need to be resolved. The
voter selects secret random numbers need to be proved
legal and the security of electoral package need to be fur-
ther researched. It is possible (and is part of work in
progress) that extensions of our ideas can give a scheme
with insecure channel and dishonest voter while maintaing
security, robustness and efficiency.
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